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Key questions
What is already known?
 ► At least 47 countries are not on track to reach the 
sustainable development goal of universal access to 
safe sanitation by 2030 and some 0.6 billion people 
are still defecating in the open.
 ► It is not clear how governments in low-income coun-
tries can be galvanised to act to resolve this pressing 
public health problem.
What are the new findings?
 ► The experience of the Clean India programme sug-
gests that countries can almost eliminate open 
defaecation.
 ► The success of the programme was due to the fol-
lowing factors: setting of ambitious targets; use of 
modern communications strategies and monitoring 
technology; and provision of visible reward and rec-
ognition for employees.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Disruptive leadership is needed to create working 
environments where, sometimes jaded, civil ser-
vants are given an opportunity to make a difference.
 ► Politicians who embrace the cause of sanitation may 
find that there are votes in toilets.
AbsTrACT
Introduction Many less developed countries are 
struggling to provide universal access to safe sanitation, 
but in the past 5 years India has almost reached its target 
of eliminating open defaecation.
Objective To understand how the Indian government 
effected this sanitation transformation.
Methods The study employed interviews with 17 actors 
in the government’s ‘Clean India’ programme across the 
national capital and four states, which were analysed using 
a theory of change grounded in Behaviour Centred Design.
results The Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) claims to 
have improved the coverage of toilets in rural India from 
39% to over 95% of households between 2014 and mid-
2019. From interviews with relevant actors we constructed 
a theory of change for the programme, in which high-
level political support and disruptive leadership changed 
environments in districts, which led to psychological 
changes in district officials. This, in turn, led to changed 
behaviour for sanitation programming. The prime minister 
set an ambitious goal of eliminating open defaecation by 
the 150th birthday of Mahatma Gandhi (October 2019). 
This galvanised government bureaucracy, while early 
success in 100 flagship districts reduced the scepticism 
of government employees, a cadre of 500 young 
professionals placed in districts imparted new ideas and 
energy, social and mass media were used to inform and 
motivate the public, and new norms of ethical behaviour 
were demonstrated by leaders. As a result, district officials 
became emotionally involved in the programme and felt 
pride at their achievement in ridding villages of open 
defaecation.
Conclusions Though many challenges remain, 
governments seeking to achieve the sustainable 
development goal of universal access to safe sanitation 
can emulate the success of India’s Swachh Bharat Mission.
In a country as powerful as India—dreaming 
of space conquest, building roads, develop-
ment—the fact that the priority of the entire 
Indian administration is to end open defaeca-
tion is extraordinary. (Interview No 14)
InTrOduCTIOn
In 2007 readers of the BMJ chose the introduc-
tion of clean water and sewage disposal—'the 
sanitary revolution'—as the most important 
medical milestone since 1840.1 Yet safe sanita-
tion, essential for the prevention of infectious 
disease, for child growth, for gender equity 
and for human dignity,2–10 has yet to reach a 
quarter of the world’s inhabitants.11
Most countries of South East Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa have struggled to improve 
their rates of toilet ownership. One country, 
however, has bucked this trend. Rural India, 
once responsible for 60% of the world’s open 
defaecators,12 has over the past five years been 
transformed by a government-led programme 
named the Clean India Mission (Swachh 
Bharat Mission (Gramin) or SBM(G)). In 2014, 
fewer than four in 10 rural Indian households 
owned a toilet; by the middle of 2019, official 
figures put coverage at over 95%.13 While it is 
hard to be certain of the actual numbers of 
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Figure 1 Generic Behaviour Centred Design theory of change.
toilets in such a vast and diverse country, it is clear that a 
major national transformation has taken place. This is an 
unlikely success story, both because Indian bureaucracy 
is not famous for its ability to create rapid change, and 
because ending open defaecation is a surprising target 
for a political campaign.
In this paper I aim to explain how this sanitation trans-
formation happened. From interviews with national, 
state and district actors, I deduce a theory of change for 
the behaviour of government officials in districts and use 
this to draw lessons for other nations wishing to emulate 
the success of the Clean India campaign.
MeTHOds
study sample
I interviewed 17 people chosen to represent a range of 
types of SBM(G) actors operating at national, state and 
district levels. Participants came from the capital and 
four states, with varied performance on toilet coverage. 
Of the interviewees, six were career civil servants, five 
were assigned to work in SBM(G), four were employed 
by partner organisations outside of government and two 
were academics. Of the total, four worked in national 
government, four at state level and six at district level. 
The aim was to have approximately four people in each 
type of position (some interviewees represented several 
types) and to continue interviewing until saturation was 
reached.14 Fifteen of the 17 interviewees were Indian 
nationals and seven were female. Eleven interviews took 
place face-to-face and six over Skype; each lasted for 
60–80 min. Interviews took place between May and July 
2018. All of the people approached agreed to take part, 
although one delegated the interview to a colleague. I 
also drew on my experience as an occasional adviser on 
behaviour change to the Indian Ministry of Drinking 
Water and Sanitation (MDWS).
study ethics
Interviewees were supplied with an information sheet 
about the study, were informed that their participation 
would be anonymous and were asked to sign a consent 
form. Identifying information was removed before tran-
scription of interviews. Ethical approval was granted by 
the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (no 
15261) and permission to conduct the study was granted 
by the MDWS.
Patient and public involvement
No patients or members of the public were involved in 
the design, analysis or reporting of this study.
data collection and analysis
The interviews followed a structured format that included 
a request to describe the SBM programme, questions 
about administrative structures, decision-making systems, 
programme financing, technical issues and specific chal-
lenges. I also asked participants about their own circum-
stances and their motives for working in SBM(G). I 
followed COREQ guidelines for the design, analysis and 
reporting of qualitative research.15
Interviews were conducted in English and recorded. 
Following transcription, I employed the steps of frame-
work analysis—namely, (i) familiarisation, (ii) identifying 
a thematic framework, (iii) indexing, (iv) charting and 
(v) mapping and interpretation.16 I employed the frame-
work of Behaviour Centred Design (BCD)17 to index 
and chart the data using NVivo version 11.18 Figure 1 
shows the generic BCD theory of change framework, 
depicting how interventions perturb the physical, biolog-
ical and social environment of actors. These changes 
affect their psychology (at an executive, motivated or 
habitual level), and lead to changes in their behaviour. 
These behavioural changes, when compounded, lead to 
changes in the state of the world—for example, better 
toilet provision in India. All these changes take place in a 
particular geographical, political, economic and cultural 
context.
resulTs
Figure 2 shows the theory of change for SMB(G) 
constructed from an analysis of the interviews using the 
BCD framework. On the right are the observed changes 
to the state of the world (improved toilet coverage and 
use). Left of this, in grey, is the change in behaviour of 
district officials. In blue, are the psychological changes in 
these actors, brought about by changes in their operating 
environments, shown in green. The orange boxes are 
aspects of the intervention (ie, the activities of SBM(G) 
M
edicine. Protected by copyright.
 o
n
 O
ctober 4, 2019 at London School of Hygiene and Tropical
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001892 on 30 September 2019. Downloaded from 
Curtis V. BMJ Global Health 2019;4:e001892. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001892 3
BMJ Global Health
Figure 2 Theory of change for the Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin). MDWS, Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation; ODF, 
open defaecation free; SBM, Swachh Bharat Mission; SDGs, sustainable development goals.
as led by the MDWS that caused this cascade of changes. 
Below I detail these changes, working from inputs to 
impact.
Interventions (inputs to sbM(G))
All interviewees ascribed the initial impetus for the 
Swachh Bharat Mission to the prime minister, Narendra 
Modi. In 2014, in his inaugural speech from the ramparts 
of the Red Fort in Delhi, Modi announced his plan for 
India to become free from open defection in 5 years, by 2 
October 2019, in honour of the 150th anniversary of the 
birth of Mahatma Gandhi. The setting of this ‘big hairy 
audacious goal’19 made the need for radical changes in 
the government’s normal approach evident:
[We are in] mission mode delivery arrangement, where 
you have a sunset clause that you have to achieve in a given 
time period… …So, it's a very different working paradigm. 
(01)
[In normal practice] the government might have said that 
we have 10 years to make India open defaecation free. So 
we might have done squat for 7 years and started working 
in the eighth year and then asked for a 5 year no-cost ex-
tension. (16)
Officials at all levels referred to the prime minister’s 
evident commitment to SBM:
The major change is that the political leadership came 
from the prime minister’s office… …to reach all the 
communities, civil societies, religious leaders, famous peo-
ple of India, actors or people in sport. Involving everybody 
at the same time for a national cause under the lead of the 
PM. (14)
…the fact that this is led by the prime minister – it is high 
on the agenda of every district collector. It has led to gov-
ernment functionaries being on their toes all the time and 
also reaching out to the people in a way that has never hap-
pened before. (12)
And the PM kept up pressure over the life of the 
programme:
So, it was not just a political announcement, but they 
backed it with serious attention over last 4 years, I think 
that’s quite dramatic. That’s one big game changer. (16)
…the PM referred to Swachh Bharat in 35 of his 50 ad-
dresses to the nation on All India Radio between October 
2014 and December 2018. (10)
Breaking with administrative norms to appoint staff 
on the basis of seniority, the prime minister sought out 
a technocrat to lead SBM(G) within the MDWS. The 
chosen secretary was a sanitation specialist and was also 
unusual in having worked both within the Indian admin-
istrative service, and outside of it in international bodies. 
This gave him the ability to navigate the government 
hierarchy, but also to see where it might be disrupted.
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In terms of technical leadership, this time the people put 
in place to lead this campaign are people with global ex-
perience that have worked abroad. They are aware of what 
is happening in the world in terms of sanitation program-
ming, successes and failures, so there is great openness to 
learning in this programme. (14)
The ministry team led a consultation exercise with 
states to gather lessons from a succession of previous 
sanitation campaigns, and to work out what it would cost 
to achieve the goal of an open defaecation free (ODF) 
India. The total bill was estimated at some US$20 billion 
over 5 years, or about US$4.00 per head of the popula-
tion per year.20 In addition, the team negotiated a loan 
of US$1.5 billion from the World Bank.21 The ministry 
also asked the World Bank, UNICEF, WaterAid and other 
support agencies to augment their technical assistance to 
states, and asked philanthropic foundations (Tata Trusts 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) to fund the 
recruitment of consultants to a project management cell:
The consultants have given a new dimension to the work-
ing of the ministry. Previously we were working like a gov-
ernment setup, but with the coming of this young blood… 
…they have given momentum to the programme. (02)
Unusually for India, the management cell was inte-
grated within the ministry rather than sitting outside 
of it. The SBM(G) team thus had access to government 
communications channels and to the cabinet and prime 
minister:
What Modi has done is picked up these bureaucrats and 
said you have direct access to me… (09)
A further input that distinguished SBM(G) from 
standard Indian government programmes was a new 
strategy for communications. The team recognised 
early on that it was important to constantly communi-
cate; downwards through the government hierarchy to 
programme actors, outwards to the population as a whole 
and to partners in the private and development sectors, 
and also, critically, back upwards to SBM’s political 
masters. Key influencers had to be kept on board:
We started delivering and then we started communicating 
that to the people who matter - like media, like the political 
masters, they need to feel that the thing is moving. Then 
there are academics, the international community, the sort 
of people who are influencers, who can spread the word. 
It's like chicken and egg: when you start doing well, then 
nothing succeeds like success, but it needs to be commu-
nicated… (11)
So point is, if you want political leadership and you get it, 
then you have to nurture it… (14)
Mass media played a major role in keeping all these 
audiences supportive and involved:
…all of our communication has become much more world 
class. Indian government ads are [normally] easily identi-
fiable from their look and feel -- they are dull, boring and 
preachy and nobody wants to watch them. But in this min-
istry the ads are very exciting and entertaining… (10)
Honestly I don't know if promoting stuff on social media 
is leading to behaviour change in rural India, but it does 
make urban India more aware about what happening in 
rural areas, for that is also important. (12)
Changes to the environment in districts
The theory of change depicts how these inputs (disrup-
tive leadership, mobilisation of human and financial 
resources, new modes of communication) changed 
the operating environment for staff working in India’s 
more than 600 districts. The new leadership team in the 
ministry recognised that the first barrier to overcome was 
widespread staff scepticism, engendered by the experi-
ence of having seen many previous campaigns falter.22 
They needed to make district officials believe that change 
was possible. One hundred districts were therefore 
targeted for an ‘early-win’ campaign. Their heads, the 
district collectors, were invited to national workshops, 
and were offered resources and, unusually, direct access 
to the leadership, to enable them to resolve any prob-
lems they encountered. By the end of 2016, most of these 
flagship districts had declared that they were ODF. This 
model was then duplicated across the country.
That is one of the great achievements (of SBM), they really 
have made sure that there is great support for any collector 
who wants to achieve this. (17)
The new leaders of SBM disrupted social norms in 
districts by modelling behaviour that was results-oriented 
and ethical. One interviewee recounted:
If the secretary is going to the field [normally], the collec-
tor’s job is to be the protocol officer, to receive him at the 
airport, ensure his dietary requirements, see his arrange-
ments are proper. Your job is to carry his briefcase. But this 
secretary focuses on the task in hand, he asks the collector 
important questions, rather than where to buy this han-
dloom saree for his wife… This changes the professional 
ethics. Then the administrators know that this guy will ask 
for results rather than where to go shopping. (09)
Several interviewees told of the surprise that they felt 
when they saw a photograph of a top ministry official 
climbing into a toilet pit to empty it in the national news-
papers.23 One top state official dug toilet pits herself. 
Another related her initiation to the SBM programme by 
a trainer which violated the norm :
’Tatti’[shit] is the most disgusting and vile word in Hindi. 
And he was just like: ‘tatti tatti’… …and I could not stop 
giggling. It is not even a word you may use, you may use this 
word at home, but not if there is a guest or someone. (10)
Many interviewees felt that such activities had caused a 
change of norms in society, and by extension, in districts:
So this is quite unique… …5 or 6 years back you could 
not even talk about defaecation. And now you see that the 
whole of India is expert on the issue of open defaecation. 
(14)
A further change to the operating environment of 
districts was the use of technology to monitor and 
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encourage progress. Collectors were set targets by the 
leadership in Delhi and then, unusually, were held to 
account. They were expected to report on progress in 
face-to-face meetings, in regular multi-participant video 
conferences and online.
Video and satellite conferences were my two important 
communication tools to connect with people and officials 
from across all the districts. I used video conferences to get 
figures on how many toilets had been built and to hand 
out targets. (15)
District collectors were trained on, and encouraged to 
sign up for, social media, and to use email:
[It is] rare for a bureaucrat to reply within an hour to an 
email. That means he has got email on his phone. Babus 
[bosses] still don’t do it to this day. (10)
In addition, the MDWS created a live ‘dashboard’; 
a website displaying progress on sanitation coverage 
showing the number of toilets built and the percentage 
of households covered.24 In many states this system 
worked automatically via a mobile phone app that was 
updated by village authorities in real time, as toilets were 
built and funds disbursed to householders’ electronic 
bank accounts.
These improvements in communications technology 
provided an environment in which districts knew they 
could be held publicly to account, but also gave them an 
opportunity to show off their success. Rather than being 
forgotten in remote corners of the country, those collec-
tors and their staff who did well were held up as examples 
on social media, invited to receive awards at multiple cere-
monies involving local, state or national dignitaries and 
some were given awards by the prime minister himself.
The secretary… …travels a lot to see what’s happening on 
the ground and he tweets almost every day about the good 
things that are happening. So, this provides a lot of motiva-
tion to the system. (08)
We had this workshop to felicitate the spouses which real-
ly touched all of them. Many of these wives… …said that 
nobody has ever acknowledged the work that we do. (15)
A further means by which ‘business-as-usual’ in districts 
was disrupted was the introduction of ‘fresh young 
blood’. Aside from deploying technical consultants, 
development partners were asked to recruit a cadre of 
new, young and enthusiastic fellows. Five hundred preraks 
were hired and assigned to support districts, where they 
took on a variety of roles.
This is how the programme works: they take fellows from 
districts which have become ODF and put them in districts 
or states wherever it’s required according to the skills and 
the needs… (08)
The preraks are an astonishing innovation… They have 
been terrific… (17)
Preraks described how they offered flexible support to 
districts, filling in where needed:
I had a collector who would call me pretty much on a daily 
basis. If I didn’t meet him, he would text me and ask about 
the update. Eventually, I would run a lot of workshops and 
he even sent me to different locations because [he said] 
‘I can’t understand what the problem is there, why don’t 
you go and check out what the problem is and just address 
it…’ (07)
Preraks supported each other and shared solutions to 
problems, often using social media:
But in terms of everyday things that we needed to carry 
out, we were calling each other on WhatsApp or email… 
‘I heard that you guys have a lot of dysfunctional toilets, 
how are you working on this?’ …that was on a WhatsApp 
group. (08)
Psychological changes
In figure 2 innovations that changed the social and tech-
nological environments in districts led to psychological 
changes (belief, motivation and habitual response) of 
the relevant officials. First, staff had to believe that change 
was possible. Officials repeatedly described how they had 
joined a civil service out of a desire to ‘serve’, but had 
been frustrated by bureaucracy and stasis:
It's just pushing up against the wall which is not going to 
move ever. So, why am wasting the good years of my youth 
and all my energy and ideas on this? (10)
But as they saw progress, staff begun to believe that the 
sanitation situation could be changed:
Because it gives you so much conviction, you know, what 
the world thought is impossible is being done in my time. 
(01)
As the results of their work became more visible, district 
officials related their pride at their achievements:
So now when I travel with my family they say: ‘see what 
is happening to your Swachh Bharat…’…I am ‘Swachh 
Bharat Champ’ they call me. (03)
Staff described their motivation for working in SBM 
using emotive terms:
There is a lot of passion for the first time in my sanitation 
business for many years. This is the first time that I have 
seen such a powerful country being mobilised in such a 
genuine and realistic way. (14)
…it is glamorous (07)
…disgust with the kind of situation people have lived in in 
our villages for such a long time… (06)
I think this whole country has been amazingly galvanised 
[by this] compelling creation, amazing euphoria…, …the 
sanitation programme is a very adventurous, courageous 
and romantic venture. (01)
However, the motive that was most often mentioned by 
staff working in districts was the opportunity that working 
in the SBM had given them to ‘make a difference’:
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It gives you satisfaction when you see that we are heading 
a programme that is being implemented and that is being 
successful and people are owning it. (03)
Because here I think I can give my best output and can 
contribute in assisting my bosses so that they can do it well 
too. (02)
The new technological environment also changed the 
habitual responses of officials—for example, by making it 
easy for them to monitor progress closely:
So now when you are in a village you log into the app [and] 
all the Swachh Bharat mission toilets are mapped there 
with the beneficiary name, with the photographs, every-
thing is there. (06)
Further, the new norms of behaviour set by national 
officials led to new working habits such as abandoning 
air-conditioned offices and spending more time in the 
field.
Changes in behaviour in districts
The cascade of changes in the operating environment and 
in the psychology of actors in SBM led to new behaviour 
in districts—the level at which staff have the mandate, 
operational staff and budgetary autonomy to organise 
development activities. Interviewees reported that the 
most important determinant of progress in latrine 
construction was the level of involvement of the district 
collector (DC). A DC who had taken on the challenge of 
SBM would typically move into ‘campaign mode’, making 
building toilets her/his priority, sometimes neglecting 
other activities to do so. The work comprised reviewing 
the sanitation status of blocks (administrative units) and 
villages, setting targets for toilet construction, organising 
payments to self-help groups and contractors, training 
masons and huge numbers of social mobilisers (swach-
hagrahis), organising mobilisation events, monitoring 
results and verifying the ODF status of villages.
DCs used a range of strategies to galvanise these activ-
ities: setting targets for blocks and villages to become 
ODF, arranging disbursement of funds, having weekly 
problem-solving meetings with block staff and some-
times, following up progress daily using social media.
The commitment of some of these collectors is quite ex-
traordinary. Some use WhatsApp to call people at 4 in the 
morning to make sure they are up for the nigrani samiti 
[morning visit to open defaecation grounds]. Quite amaz-
ing! (17)
So they [block coordinators] feel happy and motivated as 
there is regular follow-up. And as I call them almost every 
day, so they also hold meetings almost every 2 to 3 days. 
(03)
Perhaps the biggest change in the behaviour of district 
level staff was the move from ‘business-as-usual’ to a 
personal engagement with the cause:
If you are not out in the field, you are not present and 
people don’t see you, then people will not get excited. (11)
Everybody was more excited about the mission, because 
the collector himself was sitting with us. (08)
So you try to inspire people, motivate people, appeal to 
them, persuade them to do it fast, quickly and so on, in 
the mode of pulse polio [national eradication campaign], 
where in matter of a week or 10 days you can simultaneously 
start the work of construction and of triggering people. 
(15)
Change in the state of the world (impact)
What, finally, was the overall impact of these changes 
in the administrative system under the SBM(G)? The 
government of India has made repeated efforts to 
improve the sanitation conditions of its rural popula-
tion; figure 3 shows the results. After the national census 
of 1981 put national sanitation coverage at only 1%, 
the Central Rural Sanitation Program was launched in 
1986. This increased coverage to 9% and evolved into 
the Total Sanitation Campaign, which began in 1991. In 
the following 20 years, coverage improved by some 1% a 
year, reaching 31% by 2011.25 Despite a relaunch of the 
campaign, as the Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan, India failed to 
meet its millennium development goal to halve the rate 
of those with no access to sanitation by 2015.26
By contrast, 4 years after the 2014 launch of Swachh 
Bharat, official figures suggested that over 80 million 
toilets had been built; 500 districts and almost half a 
million villages had been declared free of open defae-
cation.27 Figure 3 suggests that the rate of toilet building 
in rural areas was around 10 times that of previous 
campaigns. In tandem with accelerating increases in sani-
tation coverage, government figures suggest that open 
defaecation has also decreased, dropping by 3% a year 
between 2000 and 2014 and by 12% a year from 2015 to 
2019.11
A number of unpublished surveys suggest that the 
government monitoring system overestimates the true 
levels of toilet coverage.28 29 Interviewees gave reasons 
for discrepancies between individual surveys and govern-
ment figures that included inaccuracies in the original 
government baseline against which progress is reported, 
the omission from the SBM programme of households 
with old toilets which had fallen out of use, and systemic 
incentives to over-report results. Nevertheless, inter-
viewees described exceptional progress in improving 
toilet coverage over the past 4 years, transforming India 
from a country where the majority defaecated in the 
open, to one where the majority of people have, and use, 
toilets.
I don’t think there is any historic parallel of any country 
anywhere in the world, shifting numbers on such a scale. 
That will change the global indicators. I think that the story 
is not whether it is 85%, right, or 90%, right, the story is the 
fact that there is a tremendous shift. (16)
While interviewees were positive about the gains made 
by the SBM, there were also worries about the sustaina-
bility of these gains over the long term:
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Figure 3 Household toilet coverage in India 1981–2018 according to surveys and the national monitoring system.
we brought India from A to B which is an outstanding 
achievement but there is recognition that behaviour 
change is complex, there is unfinished business and there 
is necessity to invest beyond the campaign so that we have 
a real impact by the end of the SDG era. (14)
As the final deadline for SBM looms, political attention 
to the unfinished last mile on sanitation will inevitably 
shift to other pressing social problems, such as rural water 
supply. In the face of this the MDWS is trying to embed 
sanitation in national policy, and plans to continue to 
make funds available to complete and sustain the gains 
of SBM.
On sustainability, of course the ministry is also aware; they 
have started focusing on something called ODF Plus, which 
looks at the sustainability issue. (13)
Context
Drawing transferable lessons from a programme’s theory 
of change requires understanding its particular context.30 
The SBM(G) programme took advantage of opportuni-
ties presented by the prevailing national political situa-
tion, of improvements in living conditions in rural India 
and of the proliferation of communications technology. 
It also drew on the experience of previous sanitation 
programmes, and on the global push to meet the sustain-
able development goals. Contextual factors that hindered 
progress, on the other hand, included a general scepti-
cism of government-sponsored programmes, political 
division, where some states were not supporters of the 
current government, and the many other competing 
demands for social investment in India.
Interviewees pointed out how the political context 
was key in the launch of SBM, where a swing towards a 
nationalist and pro-Hindu party provided an opportunity 
to capitalise on the symbolism of purity, cleanliness of 
the mother country and the example of Gandhi. This was 
expected to translate into electoral support:
Sanitation is something each family needs every day. And 
through his programme, Modi is able to reach out to al-
most all the households in the country. And a toilet be-
comes synonymous with Modi. So, Modi is equal to Swachh 
Bharat and Swachh Bharat is equal to a toilet. So, this has 
given him immense visibility, immense publicity and im-
mense connection with crores of households in India. (01)
Indeed, observers have suggested that the prime minis-
ter’s evident commitment to rural sanitation was a factor 
in the success of the ruling party at the 2019 general elec-
tions.31 32
You see, good sanitation is good politics. (01)
The new SBM goals were set for a nation in the midst 
of modernisation, where millions have emerged from 
poverty, and most people have improved their housing 
and gained access to electricity, water, mass communi-
cations and education.33 India was therefore ready for 
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modern toilets, and had the communications networks 
necessary to spread the idea rapidly.
The SBM(G) programme did not emerge anew but was 
set up in the context of a long line of previous national 
sanitation campaigns. These had had limited success, but 
provided experience concerning what worked and what 
did not.
The Swachh Bharat Mission is preceded by several oth-
er missions; the Total Sanitation Mission, Nirmal Bharat 
Abhiyan and other campaigns. When the Swachh Bharat 
mission started we were very much aware of this. We can't 
say that those programme were a total failure, these con-
tributed to building momentum and creating awareness, 
and some of these toilets are still in use. …definitely they 
left imprints. (05)
Both the national and international situation was 
favourable to SBM. International agreement to meet the 
sustainable development goals reminded Indian leaders 
that, though their country had made progress in many 
ways, sanitation conditions still lagged far behind those 
of countries with comparable levels of development.
dIsCussIOn
Principal findings
While it will still take some time to completely realise the 
ambition for an ODF India, the country has made large 
strides in this direction over the past 5 years. In rural 
areas of other low-income countries, around 1.5 billion 
people still lack access to basic sanitation services, and 0.6 
billion defaecate in the open.34 This study offers insights 
and lessons for the governments of countries that are 
looking to improve the sanitation conditions of their 
populations:
1. There are votes in toilets. The Indian experience suggests 
that political commitment at the head of government 
can galvanise an administration to a goal as unlikely as 
ending open defaecation, and that this may be reward-
ed politically.
2. Disrupt institutional norms. From the outset, the leaders 
of SBM(G) set out to disrupt the bureaucratic norms 
of government. The leadership modelled ethical 
norms of commitment to progress, new enthusiastic 
young staff in districts helped to create norms of adap-
tive learning, enthusiasm and personal engagement 
and the norm of polite silence about matters faecal 
was repeatedly and deliberately violated.
3. Believe the impossible. A key driver of the success pro-
gramme was the ‘big hairy audacious goal’ to make 
India ‘open defaecation free’ by 2 October 2019. Stan-
dard development programmes tend to be conserva-
tive, setting less risky, but more plausible, goals (for 
example, the Tanzanian government has set a target 
of 85% coverage with improved toilets by 2030). How-
ever, such targets neither provide a compelling vision 
nor a sense of urgency. SBM shows other countries 
that ambitious plans for sanitation transformation can 
galvanise behaviour change in institutions.
4. Set targets and monitor them. Many development pro-
grammes set targets, but few follow them up as relent-
lessly as did the Swachh Bharat team. Making use of 
electronic data gathering and real-time, public dash-
boards, the ministry team reviewed progress district by 
district, every month, sought to resolve any bottlenecks 
and held district collectors to account for their results.
5. Reward and recognition. Once districts began to meet 
their targets, their progress was deliberately and pub-
licly celebrated. Officials from successful districts were 
lauded and presented with awards at national, state 
and local events, and they, in turn, gave awards to lead-
ers and mobilisers in successful villages. Successful of-
ficials were praised in tweets and Instagram posts. As a 
result, officials were full of pride at their achievements 
and were motivated to make efforts that went well be-
yond their normal pattern of work.
6. Constant 360° communications. Unusually for a govern-
ment programme, the SBM(G) embraced modern 
communication strategies and media technologies. 
The centre kept relevant stakeholders, such as MPs, 
journalists, academics, development partners and 
private sector players, informed and involved, using 
social media, mass media, high-profile events, con-
ferences, teleconferences and personal visits. District 
officials learnt to use communications technologies 
such as email and social media to follow progress, to 
short-circuit sometimes cumbersome official channels 
and to encourage one another.
7. Focus on behaviour and sustainability. Learning from 
previous programmes in India an elsewhere, the SBM 
made major efforts to support behaviour change 
through mass training programmes and local innova-
tion.
8. A passion for sanitation. A surprising finding from this 
research was the degree of emotion shown by the re-
spondents when they described their engagement 
with the SBM programme. Motives driving their par-
ticipation included justice, creativity, nurture, status 
and disgust.35 From top to bottom of the hierarchy, 
almost every interviewee described the programme 
in emotive terms; whether as adventurous, glamor-
ous, exciting, fulfilling, pride-generating, satisfying, or 
humbling. According to one interviewee:
I will be living testimony to the fact that India will become 
ODF and I will be making a huge difference in lives of mil-
lions of people, because I am associated. The difference 
that we will make in rural India, the profound impact it 
will have on the lives of poor people is very, very satisfying, 
inspiring, humbling. (01)
Much has been written about sanitation programming, 
such as the choice of technology,36 motives for the adop-
tion of toilets,37 38 provision of subsidy,39 40 community 
participation,41 42 environmental factors43 and health 
outcomes of sanitation programmes,44–46 but only a few 
published studies have tried to unpick the successes and 
failures of government-led programmes.
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A 2012 study of the of the previous Total Sanitation 
Campaign in India22 blamed its poor results on a lack of 
political priority and leadership, a lack of confidence in 
the possibility of success, the misuse of subsidies, poor 
monitoring systems and a top-down supply-led approach. 
The results of the current study suggests that the leaders 
of SBM(G) had learnt how to resolve, at least some, of 
these problems, by capitalising on political support, 
broadcasting the successes of the programme, using elec-
tronic banking to pay subsidies directly to households, 
employing technological platforms for monitoring and 
by emphasising behaviour change. The use of electronic 
technology to monitor progress is not new to India; it has 
been employed successfully in sanitation programmes in 
Indonesia47 and Zambia.48 A lack of political will has long 
been lamented in the field of sanitation (for example, in 
India,43 Nepal,49 Tanzania50 and Ghana51), but the SBM 
example suggests a reason why politicians should become 
involved—there are votes in toilets!
The factors responsible for the success of SBM, to some 
extent, echo those identified as important for success 
in large-scale health programmes more generally. One 
survey of 20 proven programmes concluded that political 
will, technological innovation, expert consensus about 
the approach, effective use of information by manage-
ment, and sufficient financial resources were critical.52 It 
also pointed to the importance of government ownership 
of development programmes, if success is to be sustained.
The setting by the government of ambitious, ‘not-quite 
achievable’, big hairy audacious goals was undoubtedly 
one of the factors in the success of the SBM. Nevertheless, 
the pursuit of success can have what Rajkotia describes 
as an ugly side: “the high stakes, the ambition and the 
expectation can instil a fear of failure, stifle risk-taking 
and innovation, and lead to the fabrication of achieve-
ment.”53 However, for SBM a high level of awareness of 
previous failures led to innovation—for example, an 
attempt to focus on behaviour change and on construc-
tion targets. The strategy has also undoubtedly led to 
inflated claims about SBM’s results. But, as Rajkotia also 
points out, aspirational targets are important because 
they can rally governments and civil society to focus their 
energies on social development. He suggests that it might 
thus be unfair to chastise them for failure to achieve their 
aspirations completely. Countries should recognise that 
there is a virtuous circle by which aspirational targets 
can drive success, both through success itself, and by the 
learning that accrues from acknowledging, accepting 
and understanding failure to achieve them, partially or 
completely.54
Even when toilets have been built, and counted, people 
might still not use them. A study in Orissa suggested that 
while the sanitation campaigns of 1999–2012 increased 
latrine coverage substantially, over one-third of people 
with toilets were still not using them.55 Obtaining good 
data on use is difficult, but there are indications that the 
longer people have toilets the more likely they are to 
use them.56 Evidence suggests that of all the structural, 
cultural, psychological and material factors determining 
toilet acquisition and use, the most important seems to 
be the perceived social norm of not defaecating in the 
open.38 Given the much wider presence of toilets and 
greater discussion of their use, it may be that toilet use 
has reached a tipping point, beyond which their use will 
only increase.
A novel aspect of this study was the attention paid to 
the settings and motives of civil servants. This study docu-
mented positive emotions associated with participation 
in SBM(G). In Bangladesh, Hanchett found that a factor 
in the success of the national sanitation programme was 
the enthusiasm and pride of union council chairmen and 
their shared experience.57
strengths and weaknesses of the study
Courtesy bias may be partially responsible for the almost 
unanimously positive response of interviewees about 
their experience of SBM, but the enthusiasm of the SBM 
participants was clearly genuine. Given the huge size 
and heterogeneity of India, a larger study with a broader 
range of interviewees from a broader range of states 
might have provided further lessons. However, data satu-
ration was acheived early, with few new insights emerging 
after about 12 interviews.14
This study was unusual in that it focused on the 
behaviour of district officials within government institu-
tions, rather than on the effect of sanitation program-
ming on villages and households. A more complete 
investigation might have analysed the factors leading 
to behaviour change at every level in the hierarchy, 
from leaders, through ministry, state, district, block and 
village, through to householders. A future analysis of the 
factors leading to behaviour change in households could 
be expected to provide further important information.
The study also focused purely on sanitation program-
ming aimed at households in rural India. How to achieve 
universal access to sanitation in urban settings in low-in-
come countries remains a large and largely unsolved 
problem.
It might be asked how far is India a special case, and 
can the achievements of the SBM be transferred to other 
countries? India is one country among many in which 
modernisation is proceeding rapidly. Tusting et al show 
that housing is improving across sub-Saharan Africa,58 
and our research in Tanzania suggests that toilet promo-
tion can be linked to this process of modernisation.59 
India is also one of many countries in the global south 
with political leaders with ambitions for transformation, 
as was demonstrated when 53 government delegations 
attended a summit on SBM held in Delhi in October 
2018. India differs from many countries with incomplete 
sanitation in its low level of reliance on external mone-
tary help. Yet the, seemingly huge, amount it made avail-
able for toilet building amounted to only around US$4 
per person per year, a sum that could be recouped in 
financial savings associated with lower healthcare and 
other costs.60 Case studies suggest that poverty is rarely 
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a barrier to the achievement of public health goals.52 
Hence it seems likely that other countries can - if they 
wish - emulate India’s sanitation success.
The theory of change perspective of Behaviour Centred 
Design was applied for the first time to behaviour change 
in institutions. It provided a new, relatively straightfor-
ward method to understand the behaviour of actors in 
government. A new aspect of the approach was its ability 
to investigate the role of psychological factors such as 
motives, and the social and physical factors in the oper-
ational environment of the key actors. It allowed the 
creation of a structured and plausible theory of change 
from which it was possible to derive lessons that should 
be of use to other institutions wanting to improve the 
quality of public services.
Future research
SBM measured its success against a baseline set in 2013, 
but interviewees pointed out that many families had been 
left out of SBM. The government will need to tackle the 
tough ‘last mile’ problem of remote and left-out rural 
households, and find better sanitation solutions for 
the urban poor, before it can fully claim to have met its 
objective to declare the country free from open defae-
cation. Questions remain about the sustainability of the 
achievements of SBM. Much could be learnt by studying 
the different experience and differing levels of success 
across India’s widely varied 600+ districts. Future studies, 
including the national census of 2021, will disclose the 
long-term trajectory of the gains claimed by SBM.
Finally, it is increasingly understood that people 
working in institutions are motivated to act by a range 
of factors beyond immediate financial advantage.61 62 As 
one interviewee said:
All of us who are members of civil services, we joined the 
service with the vision for the betterment of society. (05)
A closer investigation of the motives of civil servants 
in national action programmes, such as the successful 
Swachh Bharat programme in India, might provide impor-
tant lessons about how best to stimulate and reward such 
activity. This could have consequences for better public 
services beyond the urgent struggle to get the sanitary 
revolution to everyone on the planet.
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